

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia  
SUBJECT Analysis of the Present Czech Political Situation  
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1. President Klement Gottwald and Rudolf Slansky have always differed on the question of Czech Communist Party (KSC) policy. Gottwald has favored the application of the Soviet system with modifications to recognize the specific conditions in Czechoslovakia, while Slansky favored a mechanical stereotyped move toward sovietization, one aspect of which was the emphasis on political reliability rather than professional competency. Slansky's system failed when the Soviet Union increased its demand on Czech production in 1950 and his methods made the Communist approach very unpopular among the Czech workers. The failure of Czech output to increase sufficiently caused even greater Soviet demands. This situation resulted in high level KSC discussions and brought about the first opposition to the Slansky line by high Communist Party officials.
2. Czech dissension was brought to the attention of the Kremlin. During the fall of 1950 Slansky visited Moscow where he denounced opposition to his line as anti-Soviet and received permission to conduct a purge. The purge was intended to produce acceptance of the Slansky line. However, Gottwald interfered after the Svermova-Sling case, and with the help of Minister of Information Vaclav Kopecky and Minister of Foreign Affairs Viliam Siroky insisted on the selection of trusted persons for important posts. In this way some Slansky men were eliminated as were such direct contacts with Moscow as Arthur London, General Bedrich Reicin, General Josef Pavel and Karel Svab. This was the first clear indication that Gottwald was trying to regain the actual deciding position in the Party.
3. Those purged were eliminated on the grounds that they were Slansky men, rather than pro-Moscow. The purge resulted in the weakened position of Slansky and Bedrich Geminder. It also further deteriorated the Communist Party and State apparatus. Simultaneously, increased Soviet economic demands, emphasizing the policy of getting the most out of Czech production in peacetime, and increased production difficulties gave Gottwald an occasion to present to the Kremlin the choice between continuing the Slansky line with no hope of gaining favorable economic results or of applying more professional methods with the promise of better results. Present Soviet thinking in military-economic terms caused the Politburo to decide temporarily to neglect the political angle and to abandon the Moscow stalwarts.

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4. The actual leadership of the KSC is now in the hands of Gottwald in policy matters as chief of the Czech Politburo and for executive power as chief of the Party Secretariat and of the Central Committee of the Party. His main strength is drawn from Vaclav Kopecky, purposely not a member of the Politburo but Gottwald's mentor, Viliam Siroky in Slovak matters, and Jaromir Dolansky in economic matters. Gottwald now dominates the Army, the security mechanism and the Party machine, and is nearer to control of the trade unions. The ultimate elimination of Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky is definite. The elimination of some of the former contact men between the Kremlin and Prague gives Gottwald the power to interpret the views of both sides.
5. [REDACTED] concludes that Gottwald will continue the aims of Moscow along with other methods in the hope of obtaining better results in the matter of Czech output, while at the same time gaining a chance to secure the domination of Czechoslovakia. [REDACTED] concludes that Gottwald is obtaining domination by pretending to achieve more for the Soviet Union. The methods applied indicate aims other than Soviet interest, and there is a possibility that Gottwald's aim is to decide the fate of Czechoslovakia in an emergency without Soviet interference.\*\*

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[REDACTED] Comment: It is believed possible that Gottwald has used the admission by Slansky, inherent in the ousting of Sling and Svermova, that he failed to prevent unreliable persons from gaining important positions for Gottwald's own political ends. He was able because of it to insist on the elimination of some of Slansky's followers as unreliable.

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\*\* [REDACTED] Comment: [REDACTED] is considered the better analyst in political matters.

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